

Crisis

US sudden, unforeseen pull-out^{in VN} would
have effect of producing Skysolt-type,
(Fait accompli) crises for govs that
have backed US policies, in:

Laos

Thailand

Philis

Japan

Korea

Australia

quite apart from "domino" effect of NVN threat.
Threat from domestic non-Comm opposition.

Oct?
Apr? '64

Khrushchev notes

Tisting

SEA

Chicom - Split

Yugoslavia, Rumania

Cyprus

Congo

Northoff

Differences for SU:

1. Capital/military vs. consumer
2. Secret police
3. Liberalism; arts
- 4.

Actions

1. Press speeches
2. RSM answers to queries
3. Mil. readiness

SU

Possible defectors; encourage? (enthusiasms)

Reaffirm commitments (e.g. test ban)

Increase surveillance, SI (analysis of SI)

Increase flow of info.

Possibilities:

a) We will not know motives, all personnel.

b) Avo

c) Reaction in satellites; they may seize moment to revolt.

d) Revolts inside Russia.

~~e) e)~~ e) S-S responses to ³⁹⁴_{into} U-2 e.g. Cuba

~~f) f)~~ f) Chinese responses to Sov moves

~~g) g)~~ g) French-British moves; German.

~~h) h)~~ h) SURPRISE (why? signif?)

We can offer: trade

Gantloff: 1) Internal, domestic factors probably dominant
(We don't know of major conflict on foreign; K had
good luck on China-SU dispute.)

2) If K was pushing strongly a radical
change in direction of increased consumer goods, etc.,
others might have appeared.

3) B-K leadership is what we would have
expected if K had tried

Mustalt - DE

do long and Skysalt

- as an ~~isolate~~

See Allison: My paper on reactions of countries
to being bombed

Perceive uncertainty as to B's response to
your (A) initiatives

- Because of response to "political
considerations"

- Because there are too many complexities,
uncertainties, changes, subjective aspects

- Effects of pain on JFK style, performance?

- Aronson guesses on LBJ?

- Mark of anatenism in bureaucracy & politics: not knowing
why to persuade, and how; disdain for power as persuader,
compared to intellectual argument.

Berlin

Telles. account strange: crisis disappears, without S
asking the question, "Why?" What were K's notions,
in retrospect? How serious? (How much were Soviets doing,
besides stating intent; what signals). A part of Aronson
program? Berlin TF planning; Berlin Home.

Above all, no mention (like Sor) of end of missile gap
(or of earlier exchange at Vienna on balance): diplomatic speech.

SU expectations on Wall: Why did they think they could
get away with it? Did WH really take a "grim view" at
the time? No mention of legal implications, costs, of Wall.

1967
29 March, 2200

Dear Frank,

Certain choices have been

Powell: Shadow + Substance. Thatist realists have
been those who place great importance on shadow/wing/will for
and who see ^{importance of} measures to preserve/build on real "substance".
in terms of effect on rep. (rather than ignoring developments
that don't change substance, or that improve substance in worsening rep.)
Howel: Acheson, ^{even Dulles.} Bell & Butler. Book: early JFK; she is relying
on (recent) substance & allowing rep to dwindle; Morgenthau.

Looking at system: close-up, in detail; at process; in retrospect
with good access;

(11) How badly system worked: ^{despite "good men"} Missile Gap (though
^{the misses got worse} brilliant resolution); Laos; Cuba; SVN; NATO;
Missile Crisis (very intense); ^{Cost of} Sov testing; Wall; France; Skybolt
(later: Bom Rep, Kowloon, SVN; turned in China;
Expectations: Berlin; Test Ban; Missile Crisis itself

(Intell failures; yet CIA looks no worse than other
cognitive functions in govt) (better, on SVN)

Domestically: better on Civil Rights, Economics

But cities; Negro problem; crime

Need to improve the ^{environment} ~~situation~~: incidence of crime
"miscalculation"

US now preoccupied by crisis / surprise / threatening
initiatives, just as GVN preoccupied by urban
riots ^(or US budget dominated by SVN) [Calculate costs, in attention and time + staff
effort, of clear mistakes by us or avoidable miscalculations
by others, in terms of effort towards long-run problems,
new initiatives.] (like McN's problem with Congress, over

B-70: compare to Quiet-3 war struggle). (+) risks of blow-up
(or VN-like war)

VFK initial concern with "miscalculation":

Note how many actually occurred (miscalc. of his own
reaction: Berlin, Steel, Cuba missiles, Dien-Pheung raid; Skybolt miscalculated
4/2 did not occur, etc.);

~~29 March 1967~~

Don Parula,

Themes to comment on from Larsonson/Schlesinger:

1) C/A in Bay of Pigs ^{in 1961} and SVN = Indochina 532

(CIA shortcomings; Phillips thesis)

2) Berlin crisis - puzzle of resolution; what it led to.

3) Missile gap ending: efforts (Vienna, Berlin, R. Philpotts, ...)
Civil Defense

7) Shadow + substance of power; Bay of Pigs; Wrecking; Berlin;
482; 483

Cuba (Tinsley). Concern for "Amelioration."

5) Steel crisis — Missile crisis

1. (Compare Comm still in
closing out a crisis: Remoy)

6) Missile crisis:

- Secrecy

- role of continents

- k. intent; expectations (election)

- Shootdowns + ultimatum; Carbon control

- Turkish ICBM, incident

7) Untold: change of war plans;
Pres C+C MRF fully

501 JFK attitudes on troops in Iran
Ann Arbor; helping General; NATO imposed

8/ SUN : native for commitment

(thousands) binding loss, Cuba, Berlin, SVN, Cuba - Wendeberg, finally SVN

2) Cyanfran tablets in JFK (like SD):
not nuclear,

demonstration of the cost of
 having "prestige" - when
 bluff is called.

100 Cont. of virus settlement: infiltration

Keweenaw

Crisis

Hyp: I perception of a very ambiguous situation
as unambiguous, call for strong, risky,
irreversible action, suggests either

(1) desire/need to perceive it that way
[or, to perceive it as unambiguous?]

and/or (2) desire/need — pushes for other, or
complex, or unconscious reasons — to take

→ that action

[or, "some strong action"?]

E.g. (1) Interpretation of Sov motives in Cold War

(e.g. in Greece) (or, w.r.t. Hungary)

(2) Bomber/missile gaps

(3) ABM gap

(4) Second Jordan Gulf incident.

(5) Interpret. of Chinese motives?

Crisis

What happens to proposals for:

(1) threats, to precede actions?

[(2) before Hiroshima

(b) before bombing of NVN

(c) before Dien Bien Phu

[But: Cuba II]

What happens to : proposals to negot

(5) Then at onset of bombing NVN.

What if: Plokin had not come, during Korygin
visit: and

(a) SU had made clear its intent to support
but (b) had proposed timely negot plan, before

Did VC take the attack deliberately?

(Or, to coincide with McG visit?)

Why Plokin?

What was Korygin reaction? How was
SU policy affected?

Why Qui Nam?

(Harold Wilson, Times)

Did we foresee UK support? Lack of pressure for
negate?

Crisis

Westy saw VN as a slow crisis from 1964

on: - US troops were required to save VN

- VN must be saved

- It would take time to bring in US troops:

must start as soon as possible

(NVA troops would have been perfect expense; but
^{Westy!}
we didn't know of these soon enough.)

(Westy wasn't looking for expense then.)

Westy was betrayed by his J-2: reflexes
from Harkins' era!)

Is led to point to (small) Com successors of spring '6
and ride on the commitments ravined by the bombing.

Wolfe: is this a success or a failure for
US

Team for a change"

"he lost China!"

Loon: Series of mistakes lost him ability to build support, protect his power.

Precipitating incident: speech on reallocation.

Loon: maybe they didn't want to give him chance to consolidate his position on celebration of coronation

Timing: His crises have come when he was out of ^{of power} town: 1957, last April, Yungchow Jozan.

Altman: His "wrong" approach



Does

Real doesn't that we should speculate

(How will Sovs react to Chinese nuclear explosion?)

Sovs: They may accept Chinese bid to a summit on
disarmament.

Does

(Continuation of

Cuban files

Correspondence

4.

1. Did B + K have access to letters?

Thompson: Bob had said they hadn't³: only K, Mungo,

...

(others: can't believe that. T: can't assume they did know.) But they have access now.

T: correspondence has been moribund for some time;
no need to resume before election.

T: I've straddled the issue of demigod vs. gladiator
party vs. bureaucrat: one of each. But this can't go on; when the
I would put my money on Podgorny to be the
new thundershower; the only one who is the K type.



T: Watch out not to provide incidents, provocations.

Don't go closer than ... 20 miles, etc.

(Pulled thruster back; called off flight. [Cuba]

Cuban video? 304?

T: They're going to wait for an election in my event -

They will want to keep things on dead center -

T: We might nudge them on Indonesia - Malaysia.

T: They will also want to wait and see how weak the

British labor now is.

Horlick 1500 16 Oct

Nepotism

Cult of personality

personal diplomacy

Adzhubee's visit to Germany

(Will visit to West Germany be
picked up by Kossygin?)

"There are some comrades who say I shouldn't

They have presented K with a fait accompli.
Was meeting a full meeting of the Central
Committee — did they fly in members from all —
give K a chance to marshal support

+

did Ambassadors come in? (I hope

Pravda edit; no policy issues mentioned

Free-wheeling

have. brainiac schemes

Not taking into account achievements of science &
technology

Nepotism

See article by Talensky in Int. Affairs #10, 1964
on ABM (Deployment by peace-loving
gov is not destabilizing). Problem for SU.

Tal. has taken K, non-military position

▲ ▲ ▲

Vague commitment to deStalinization

Not until about 1961 that K was described
as C/NC, by Malinovsky; not in Const.

Const: Presidium

Malinovsky now in control of the armed forces than
before; but prob. Brezhnev in charge. Decisions
by majority vote of the Presidium.

Horelich

Brezhnev senior partner.

Leaders don't want to give all power
to one man; split

[Joint US-Brits initiative on non-proliferation
Present rules not to assist others] □ □

Howard Smeaton, UCLA: book on
The Politics of Succession (in USSR)

(FROG + SCUD missiles prob. held by all ~~south~~ ¹⁶
East Eur armies except Albania + Yugoslavia.

Nov '64

Crisis Talk

1. Role of preconceptions

(prior probs; hypotheses...

acts, relevant states, values,

info sources, L.O.; prior probs)

Effect on "inference",

reflection.

2. Relevance of formal models

of decision; a critique

UCCA Talk

1. Tension

2. Presumption: focus: attention

3.

Cuban II Crisis

I did not know:

(1) Turkish missiles were removed by JFK.
and SU was told; but this was in
context of ultimatum!

Moreover, message to NATO did was not
delivered [because of ultimatum? Waiting for
reply? Ask Nitzze.] yet decision was
made, and was told!

Hence, had to follow Reagan / sworn kindred
(Emitt Hughes, 2 Oct 67) advice: "Pick ^{Decide what} ~~places~~
not to save ... " "Costs doubt on our
(mad?) determination to stop Communism; a unilateral
resolution that is real basis not only of faith in
our treaties but in our continued help even without
treaty: i.e. SVN. " I.e. Free World relies on
US internal (Resolve) to oppose & stop Communism
everywhere: more than on our Word, & whether or
not Word has really been given.

SVN put in properly worldwide faith in our
"Compulsion to Oppose" Communism, not in reliability
of our Promise to Help an ally.

"Losing" a country to Communism (and in
this setting, every shift is regarded by others—and
believed by them to be regarded by US—as a
US "loss") thus always generates ^{US} will & ability;
hence, if a commitment is needed to prevent "loss,"
hard for us to withhold it. We end up pledged
to oppose worldwide not only "aggression" but
any shift to or even towards (DemRep) Communism
(thus, opposition to elections in SVN; Thailand?)

Crisis + Commitments

[Can't just say, Weakness (Loss, Ego of Pigs, health) → independent commitments (+ every boldness) → war/crisis. (SVN; Cuba II). ^{Admitted...} (Munich → Polish guarantee, Russian threat → War); Withdrawal from Korea → Korea as if Fairness/commitment always led to Peace.
Tough: Cuba II ^{Berlin} → Peace
Queney II + II → Peace]

Costs/pains of commitments Korea → Taiwan, SVN (Korea 1967)
Also commitment/toughness can lead to other, less prudent commitment; → eventually to temptation or frustration of an effort → war.

1) Need to establish rationale for our commitment, gain broad support, may make it difficult to reach other commitments, or to draw back from extended or rash commitments; or to make desirable modifications. 2) And success can lead to over-confidence, and over-reliance on threat. 3) Commitment by US tends to make effort by ally look unnecessary or inadequate (ARVN; NATO allies) → their contribution (and the security and domestic politics, budget) addressed → determine things more + more critically on US involved → great apprehension over any acts that symbolically look like US will: e.g. fail to make new commitments, show hesitancy to come or concern for others... (VH)

For the President: the Crisis is the Pay-off

Crisis are the health of the Presidency

[On: Humiliation and the Web of Crisis

ⁱⁿ Tempo: Chinese humiliation during 1850-1920 as root of nationalism. (Cf. Black Nationalism) VN.

Incidents: Suez, U-2, Cuba I, Cuba II, Laos, Wall

Crisis = public decision-making, with high humiliation - potential. Hence, it is post crisis that form a major context for current/present crisis (in minds of (a) public, and (b) bureaucracy).

Crisis is Presidential decision-making; his own preferences/etc. are revealed more to bureaucracy - even more than to public - in crisis than usual; ^{with} more ^{pub} attention. Thus, post crisis info attitudes/decisions determine how current decisions will be interpreted: post crisis supply the hypotheses and prior probs, for drawing inferences (e.g., "JFK is a gutter...")

Crisis are the Tests, the Experiments, the Sample-point observations on the President.

On: "people" (public, bureaucracy, allies, enemies) have theories of "Pres/US behavior in crises" (i.e., policy, anti-comm crises), which they test, apply, modify in new crises: for this, crises (as a rule-elt) are the sample space: Pres must refer to this space if he is to make rational interpretations. The Council, the Test, the Pay-off.

Antecedents: 1) discrimination, hesitation in making
commitments; ^{awareness of costs of failure, hard to limit} 2) insistence / leverage to force Allied
efforts, not except over-reliance on US; 3)
discrimination in making, avoiding commitments: consciousness
of costs - pressures to make new ones elsewhere.

(avoiding a ^{new} commitment - as Bay, Laos - taken
as underlining faith in old commitments - Berlin, SVN,
Thailand - requiring other new ones to restore.)

Key by faith

Failure can lead to avoidance of new
commitments (Bay of Pigs - Laos; SVN now → Congo
now) (Bay → limits on SVN, fall '61)

By Fall 1961, JFK Admin was committed -
Prone (esp. in Far East) yet, for SVN and SEA,
Troop-ly. A need to make at least a
symbolic commitment - yet skepticism and
reluctance to insert troops.

[Note: case made by Taylor for troops - 1961 - my
like McNamara case for bombing North, in Feb 1965: latter
less urgent, action more radical: yet LBJ took latter, JFK
avoided former.]

Crisis

(What makes so many congressmen "desperate" to Pres(— since multiple crises — since distracts attention from other measures, problems and multiple violent "solutions")?

(a) Domestic political congressmen

(b) Alliance politics.

Consider why these: (1) are taken so seriously by Pres

(2) Why the congressmen respond, ~~just~~

(e.g. use of deception, secrecy, "position")

Rostow July '65 Contingency Planning

[A reason for distrust: A plan that is done

- a) quickly, but non-urgently
- b) by low-level staff
- c) long before the event
- d) [on single-agency basis]

is unlikely to correspond to the plan that would emerge close to the event, with:

- a) high-level participation; interagency
- b) urgent focus of attention
- c) current details.

Hence: 1) "wanted" TBR

2) if irrevocable decisions made, alternatives excluded, regrettable loss of flexibility, capability.

3) may focus expectations so as to cause surprise; fix reflexes so as to slow response.

Rostow 1 July '65 Contingency Planning

[A reason for distrust: A plan that is done

- 2) privately, but non-urgently
- b) by low-level staff
- =) long before the event
- d) [on sight-seeing basis]

is unlikely to correspond to the plan that would emerge close to the event, with:

- a) high-level participation; interagency
- b) urgent focus of attention
- c) current details.

Hence: 1) "wanted" TSP

2) if irrevocable decisions made, alternatives excluded, regrettable loss of flexibility, capability.

3) may focus expectations so as to cause surprise; fix reflexes so as to slow response.

[Ante-crisis planning :

1) planning, or

2) crisis-like activity

to prevent a specific, identifiable

crisis.

(Jordan waters; ?

Komer: "Systematic [explicit extended form] analysis of the problem almost nil"

"systematic planning of the preventive phase of problems we can all see coming down the pike.

e.g. how to get through the Jordan waters disputes without an Arab-Israeli dispute.

Thompson: Study what could have been done to prevent crises, avoid them?

(Skylott

Hidden Crisis

14/18322 recd 14/1445 Wash

Opfer (border crosser in Stanleyville)

to Rabe CINC in Pambis:

Have received tel from Bumba. 5 American planes
have been shot. Request you authorize me to kill
all Americans who are in the liberated zone. Awaiting
your answer.

("We got a message we wish we hadn't gotten.")

Oct⁷ 1964

Braufu; Hankin; Cooper;

Surge Commanders expected to be stopped before they started; never imagined they might be stopped in middle.

(Braufu: thinks Paris/London leaders did that this, after start, though commanders didn't know it.

Cooper: Strong concern that operation be short as possible, because of UN reaction.

[Didn't foresee US pressure?] Big one

Limits of Presidential Power — and Patience

Show cases where Pres is pressed along
policy lines where he doesn't really believe:

(MLF, conventional strategy, no aid to French; CB)
on budget; Bay of Pigs) and how this snaps in a crisis,
or limit. (Opponent, knowing Pres may not believe what
he says, "helps" him with fait accompli; or fails to believe.

Or Pres is unable to get what he wants:

He: Korean (China?) troop reduction

JFK: Turkish (ROM) aid (Crisis, and after-Crisis.)

- JFK failure to control the MLF cabal.

[Is the LBJ offer of a billion dollars to
SVN/NVN ^{after the war} good if NVN wins?]

Comment: Dim
Note: US response to "request" — that had been
drafted by USG.

[Compare recommendations/reasons in Taylor
Report with Ct/Kalpakovic.]

How big a challenge was perceived by Washington?

(Clear breach of Geneva)

Why urgent? VC? or internal weakness,
requiring success against VC (better not urgent
in itself?)?

Compare two Jordan reports.

Theory of the faint accompani:

To move before : 1. 2) Opponent can take positive steps to forestall you

b) Opponent can commit himself to permit you.

He may still furnish if he thinks the effect of this on future situations is "worth the trouble." But before you moved, he might have committed himself to a furnishment worse for you and more costly for him because

5) He didn't expect it to be "called"; he hoped to deter; he attached low probability to this possibility.

2) The punishment for ignoring a threat must be greater than

(or, in addition to) the punishment intended to deter a specific act in the future. He has invested "face" in the process of commitment; he must protect its status for all future threat situations.

Never fight, and you encourage him to maximize against your move (with "old" abilities).

c) May even forestall punishment; or, more likely, make it more costly (e.g. make it appear "unstable") and undermine them. If opponent had been able to explain.

What situation in which we can decide that A has caused B's behavior.

2-5 lb flour
2-3 lb sugar
chick steak
lamb chops
frozen veg